The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States of America is a Webnovel created by W. E. B. Du Bois.
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[18] Force, _American Archives_, 4th Ser., I. 1136.
[19] _Ibid._, II. 279-81.
[20] _Ibid._, I. 1160.
[21] Force, _American Archives_, 4th Ser., I. 1163.
[22] _Journals of Cong._, May 13, 15, 1775.
[23] _Ibid._, May 17, 1775.
[24] Force, _American Archives_, 4th Ser., II. 1545.
[25] Drayton, _Memoirs of the American Revolution_, I. 182.
Cf. pp. 181-7; Ramsay, _History of S. Carolina_, I. 231.
[26] Force, _American Archives_, 4th Ser., II. 33-4.
[27] _Journals of Cong._, II. 122.
[28] Clarkson, _Impolicy of the Slave-Trade_, pp. 125-8.
[29] _Ibid._, pp. 25-6.
[30] _Ibid._
[31] Jefferson, _Works_ (Washington, 1853-4), I. 23-4. On the Declaration as an anti-slavery doc.u.ment, cf. Elliot, _Debates_ (1861), I. 89.
[32] Jefferson, _Works_ (Washington, 1853-4), I. 19.
[33] Clarkson, _Impolicy of the Slave-Trade_, pp. 25-6; _Report_, etc., as above.
[34] Witness the many high duty acts on slaves, and the revenue derived therefrom. Ma.s.sachusetts had sixty distilleries running in 1783. Cf. Sheffield, _Observations on American Commerce_, p. 267.
[35] Elliot, _Debates_, I. 72-3. Cf. Art. 8 of the Articles of Confederation.
[36] _Journals of Cong._, 1781, June 25; July 18; Sept. 21, 27; Nov. 8, 13, 30; Dec. 4.
[37] _Ibid._, 1782-3, pp. 418-9, 425.
[38] _Annals of Cong._, 1 Cong. 2 sess. p. 1183.
[39] Cf. above, chapters ii., iii., iv.
_Chapter VI_
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1787.
32. The First Proposition.
33. The General Debate.
34. The Special Committee and the “Bargain.”
35. The Appeal to the Convention.
36. Settlement by the Convention.
37. Reception of the Clause by the Nation.
38. Att.i.tude of the State Conventions.
39. Acceptance of the Policy.
32. ~The First Proposition.~ Slavery occupied no prominent place in the Convention called to remedy the glaring defects of the Confederation, for the obvious reason that few of the delegates thought it expedient to touch a delicate subject which, if let alone, bade fair to settle itself in a manner satisfactory to all. Consequently, neither slavery nor the slave-trade is specifically mentioned in the delegates’ credentials of any of the States, nor in Randolph’s, Pinckney’s, or Hamilton’s plans, nor in Paterson’s propositions. Indeed, the debate from May 14 to June 19, when the Committee of the Whole reported, touched the subject only in the matter of the ratio of representation of slaves. With this same exception, the report of the Committee of the Whole contained no reference to slavery or the slave-trade, and the twenty-three resolutions of the Convention referred to the Committee of Detail, July 23 and 26, maintain the same silence.
The latter committee, consisting of Rutledge, Randolph, Gorham, Ellsworth, and Wilson, reported a draft of the Const.i.tution August 6, 1787. The committee had, in its deliberations, probably made use of a draft of a national Const.i.tution made by Edmund Randolph.[1] One clause of this provided that “no State shall lay a duty on imports;” and, also, “1. No duty on exports. 2. No prohibition on such inhabitants as the United States think proper to admit. 3. No duties by way of such prohibition.” It does not appear that any reference to Negroes was here intended. In the extant copy, however, notes in Edward Rutledge’s handwriting change the second clause to “No prohibition on such inhabitants or people as the several States think proper to admit.”[2]
In the report, August 6, these clauses take the following form:–
“Article VII. Section 4. No tax or duty shall be laid by the legislature on articles exported from any state; nor on the migration or importation of such persons as the several states shall think proper to admit; nor shall such migration or importation be prohibited.”[3]
33. ~The General Debate.~ This, of course, referred both to immigrants (“migration”) and to slaves (“importation”).[4] Debate on this section began Tuesday, August 22, and lasted two days. Luther Martin of Maryland precipitated the discussion by a proposition to alter the section so as to allow a prohibition or tax on the importation of slaves. The debate immediately became general, being carried on princ.i.p.ally by Rutledge, the Pinckneys, and Williamson from the Carolinas; Baldwin of Georgia; Mason, Madison, and Randolph of Virginia; Wilson and Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania; d.i.c.kinson of Delaware; and Ellsworth, Sherman, Gerry, King, and Langdon of New England.[5]
In this debate the moral arguments were prominent. Colonel George Mason of Virginia denounced the traffic in slaves as “infernal;” Luther Martin of Maryland regarded it as “inconsistent with the principles of the revolution, and dishonorable to the American character.” “Every principle of honor and safety,” declared John d.i.c.kinson of Delaware, “demands the exclusion of slaves.” Indeed, Mason solemnly averred that the crime of slavery might yet bring the judgment of G.o.d on the nation.
On the other side, Rutledge of South Carolina bluntly declared that religion and humanity had nothing to do with the question, that it was a matter of “interest” alone. Gerry of Ma.s.sachusetts wished merely to refrain from giving direct sanction to the trade, while others contented themselves with pointing out the inconsistency of condemning the slave-trade and defending slavery.
The difficulty of the whole argument, from the moral standpoint, lay in the fact that it was completely checkmated by the obstinate att.i.tude of South Carolina and Georgia. Their delegates–Baldwin, the Pinckneys, Rutledge, and others–a.s.serted flatly, not less than a half-dozen times during the debate, that these States “can never receive the plan if it prohibits the slave-trade;” that “if the Convention thought” that these States would consent to a stoppage of the slave-trade, “the expectation is vain.”[6] By this stand all argument from the moral standpoint was virtually silenced, for the Convention evidently agreed with Roger Sherman of Connecticut that “it was better to let the Southern States import slaves than to part with those States.”
In such a dilemma the Convention listened not unwillingly to the _non possumus_ arguments of the States’ Rights advocates. The “morality and wisdom” of slavery, declared Ellsworth of Connecticut, “are considerations belonging to the States themselves;” let every State “import what it pleases;” the Confederation has not “meddled” with the question, why should the Union? It is a dangerous symptom of centralization, cried Baldwin of Georgia; the “central States” wish to be the “vortex for everything,” even matters of “a local nature.” The national government, said Gerry of Ma.s.sachusetts, had nothing to do with slavery in the States; it had only to refrain from giving direct sanction to the system. Others opposed this whole argument, declaring, with Langdon of New Hampshire, that Congress ought to have this power, since, as d.i.c.kinson tartly remarked, “The true question was, whether the national happiness would be promoted or impeded by the importation; and this question ought to be left to the national government, not to the states particularly interested.”
Beside these arguments as to the right of the trade and the proper seat of authority over it, many arguments of general expediency were introduced. From an economic standpoint, for instance, General C.C.
Pinckney of South Carolina “contended, that the importation of slaves would be for the interest of the whole Union. The more slaves, the more produce.” Rutledge of the same State declared: “If the Northern States consult their interest, they will not oppose the increase of slaves, which will increase the commodities of which they will become the carriers.” This sentiment found a more or less conscious echo in the words of Ellsworth of Connecticut, “What enriches a part enriches the whole.” It was, moreover, broadly hinted that the zeal of Maryland and Virginia against the trade had an economic rather than a humanitarian motive, since they had slaves enough and to spare, and wished to sell them at a high price to South Carolina and Georgia, who needed more. In such case restrictions would unjustly discriminate against the latter States. The argument from history was barely touched upon. Only once was there an allusion to “the example of all the world” “in all ages” to justify slavery,[7] and once came the counter declaration that “Greece and Rome were made unhappy by their slaves.”[8] On the other hand, the military weakness of slavery in the late war led to many arguments on that score. Luther Martin and George Mason dwelt on the danger of a servile cla.s.s in war and insurrection; while Rutledge hotly replied that he “would readily exempt the other states from the obligation to protect the Southern against them;” and Ellsworth thought that the very danger would “become a motive to kind treatment.” The desirability of keeping slavery out of the West was once mentioned as an argument against the trade: to this all seemed tacitly to agree.[9]
Throughout the debate it is manifest that the Convention had no desire really to enter upon a general slavery argument. The broader and more theoretic aspects of the question were but lightly touched upon here and there. Undoubtedly, most of the members would have much preferred not to raise the question at all; but, as it was raised, the differences of opinion were too manifest to be ignored, and the Convention, after its first perplexity, gradually and perhaps too willingly set itself to work to find some “middle ground” on which all parties could stand. The way to this compromise was pointed out by the South. The most radical pro-slavery arguments always ended with the opinion that “if the Southern States were let alone, they will probably of themselves stop importations.”[10] To be sure, General Pinckney admitted that, “candidly, he did not think South Carolina would stop her importations of slaves in any short time;” nevertheless, the Convention “observed,”
with Roger Sherman, “that the abolition of slavery seemed to be going on in the United States, and that the good sense of the several states would probably by degrees complete it.” Economic forces were evoked to eke out moral motives: when the South had its full quota of slaves, like Virginia it too would abolish the trade; free labor was bound finally to drive out slave labor. Thus the chorus of “_laissez-faire_” increased; and compromise seemed at least in sight, when Connecticut cried, “Let the trade alone!” and Georgia denounced it as an “evil.” Some few discordant notes were heard, as, for instance, when Wilson of Pennsylvania made the uncomforting remark, “If South Carolina and Georgia were themselves disposed to get rid of the importation of slaves in a short time, as had been suggested, they would never refuse to unite because the importation might be prohibited.”
With the spirit of compromise in the air, it was not long before the general terms were clear. The slavery side was strongly intrenched, and had a clear and definite demand. The forces of freedom were, on the contrary, divided by important conflicts of interest, and animated by no very strong and decided anti-slavery spirit with settled aims. Under such circ.u.mstances, it was easy for the Convention to miss the opportunity for a really great compromise, and to descend to a scheme that savored unpleasantly of “log-rolling.” The student of the situation will always have good cause to believe that a more st.u.r.dy and definite anti-slavery stand at this point might have changed history for the better.
34. ~The Special Committee and the “Bargain.”~ Since the debate had, in the first place, arisen from a proposition to tax the importation of slaves, the yielding of this point by the South was the first move toward compromise. To all but the doctrinaires, who shrank from taxing men as property, the argument that the failure to tax slaves was equivalent to a bounty, was conclusive. With this point settled, Randolph voiced the general sentiment, when he declared that he “was for committing, in order that some middle ground might, if possible, be found.” Finally, Gouverneur Morris discovered the “middle ground,” in his suggestion that the whole subject be committed, “including the clauses relating to taxes on exports and to a navigation act. These things,” said he, “may form a bargain among the Northern and Southern States.” This was quickly a.s.sented to; and sections four and five, on slave-trade and capitation tax, were committed by a vote of 7 to 3,[11]
and section six, on navigation acts, by a vote of 9 to 2.[12] All three clauses were referred to the following committee: Langdon of New Hampshire, King of Ma.s.sachusetts, Johnson of Connecticut, Livingston of New Jersey, Clymer of Pennsylvania, d.i.c.kinson of Delaware, Martin of Maryland, Madison of Virginia, Williamson of North Carolina, General Pinckney of South Carolina, and Baldwin of Georgia.
The fullest account of the proceedings of this committee is given in Luther Martin’s letter to his const.i.tuents, and is confirmed in its main particulars by similar reports of other delegates. Martin writes: “A committee of _one_ member from each state was chosen by ballot, to take this part of the system under their consideration, and to endeavor to agree upon some report which should reconcile those states [i.e., South Carolina and Georgia]. To this committee also was referred the following proposition, which had been reported by the committee of detail, viz.: ‘No navigation act shall be pa.s.sed without the a.s.sent of two thirds of the members present in each house’–a proposition which the staple and commercial states were solicitous to retain, lest their commerce should be placed too much under the power of the Eastern States, but which these last States were as anxious to reject. This committee–of which also I had the honor to be a member–met, and took under their consideration the subjects committed to them. I found the _Eastern_ States, notwithstanding their _aversion to slavery_, were very willing to indulge the Southern States at least with a temporary liberty to prosecute the slave trade, provided the Southern States would, in their turn, gratify _them_, by laying no restriction on navigation acts; and after a very little time, the committee, by a great majority, agreed on a report, by which the general government was to be prohibited from preventing the importation of slaves for a limited time, and the restrictive clause relative to navigation acts was to be omitted.”[13]
That the “bargain” was soon made is proven by the fact that the committee reported the very next day, Friday, August 24, and that on Sat.u.r.day the report was taken up. It was as follows: “Strike out so much of the fourth section as was referred to the committee, and insert ‘The migration or importation of such persons as the several states, now existing, shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the legislature prior to the year 1800; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such migration or importation, at a rate not exceeding the average of the duties laid on imports.’ The fifth section to remain as in the report. The sixth section to be stricken out.”[14]
35. ~The Appeal to the Convention.~ The ensuing debate,[15] which lasted only a part of the day, was evidently a sort of appeal to the House on the decisions of the committee. It throws light on the points of disagreement. General Pinckney first proposed to extend the slave-trading limit to 1808, and Gorham of Ma.s.sachusetts seconded the motion. This brought a spirited protest from Madison: “Twenty years will produce all the mischief that can be apprehended from the liberty to import slaves. So long a term will be more dishonorable to the American character than to say nothing about it in the Const.i.tution.”[16] There was, however, evidently another “bargain” here; for, without farther debate, the South and the East voted the extension, 7 to 4, only New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia objecting. The ambiguous phraseology of the whole slave-trade section as reported did not pa.s.s without comment; Gouverneur Morris would have it read: “The importation of slaves into North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, shall not be prohibited,” etc.[17] This emendation was, however, too painfully truthful for the doctrinaires, and was, amid a score of objections, withdrawn. The taxation clause also was manifestly too vague for practical use, and Baldwin of Georgia wished to amend it by inserting “common impost on articles not enumerated,” in lieu of the “average”
duty.[18] This minor point gave rise to considerable argument: Sherman and Madison deprecated any such recognition of property in man as taxing would imply; Mason and Gorham argued that the tax restrained the trade; while King, Langdon, and General Pinckney contented themselves with the remark that this clause was “the price of the first part.” Finally, it was unanimously agreed to make the duty “not exceeding ten dollars for each person.”[19]